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Skepticism Concerning Human Agency 
Sciences of the Self Versus " Voluntariness " in the La w 
PAUL SHELDON DAVIES 
The findings of neuroscience cast grave doubts on the view of human agency implicit in the law. They do this by forcing us toward a form of skepticism 
concerning our capacities as agents. That is the thesis of this chapter. 
The findings of neuroscience do not cast doubt in isolation. They do so 
when combined with findings in cognitive and social psychology and find­
ings in evolutionary theory and primate cognition, and when integrated into a 
large-canvas view that sometimes results from informed philosophical reflec­
tion. This is a powerful methodological directive demonstrated throughout 
On the Origin of Species, a directive that ought to be adopted in the study of the 
self as much as in the study of life. 
The logic of Darwin's (1859) argument is a sequence of abductive arguments 
concerning a broad range of distinct biological, geological, and geographi­
cal phenomena. None of his arguments is decisive taken alone, and some are 
stronger than others, but their combined power comes from a weighty con­
vergence upon a single, unifying view of life, drawn from an accumulation 
of inferences to the best explanation concerning several distinct phenomena. 
This strategy, so potent in the study of life, is our best bet in the study of capac­
ities that animate living things. Questions about human agency, for instance, 
including the viability of concepts of legal responsibility, cannot be settled 
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with a small set of experiments or a localized hypothesis. What we need is a 
large-canvas view that integrates knowledge trom the relevant sciences. And 
once we formulate such a view, we find that at present we do not know what 
kind of agent we are. An informed skepticism best describes where we are 
today. 
Ihe shape of my argument is as follows. Section 1 introduces the main 
target of my discussion: a concept of voluntariness that appears essential 
to a concept of criminal responsibility. I focus on "voluntariness" for the 
sake of concreteness. Once we appreciate the converging doubts against 
this concept, doubts concerning other concepts of agency naturally arise. 
Section II is a brief summary of my very general grounds for thinking that 
the methods with which we study the human self are in need of reform. The 
following two sections offer a more specific defense of this call for reform, 
as well as a few preliminary reformative steps, what I call directives for 
inquiry. 1 propose one directive in section III that is ameliorative or cura­
tive in nature and three additional directives in section IV that are explora­
tory rather than curative. Then, in section V, on the basis of my proposed 
directives, I defend my skepticism regarding human agency. I conclude by 
drawing out the implications of this skepticism for the specified notion of 
criminal responsibility. 
"VOLUNTARINESS" AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
For the sake of concreteness, I focus on the partial characterization of criminal 
guilt from section 2.01 of the Model Penal Code, which states that an agent is 
criminally guilty for a given action only if it was voluntary, where "voluntary 
action" is characterized in conditions (a) to (d): 
A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct 
that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which 
he is physically capable. The following are not voluntary acts within the 
meaning of this Section: (a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement 
during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or result­
ing from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is 
not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious 
or habitual. 
The core assertion is simple, at least on the surface: the attribution of guilt 
for an action is justified only if the agent's conduct was a bodily movement 
produced by "the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or 
habitual."1 
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It may appear, however, that a person can be guilty in a quite different way, 
by failing to perform some action despite being physically capable. An agent 
may be guilty not by virtue of actions that result from effort or determination 
but simply by virtue of omissions, in which case this section of the Model Penal 
Code may be interpreted as articulating two distinct concepts of legal respon­
sibility, only one of which employs "voluntariness." Although I am skeptical of 
any such "two concepts" interpretation, I shall, for the sake of this discussion, 
restrict my argument to acts of commission and silently pass over the question 
of whether criminal acts of omission rest upon a prior "voluntary" act that the 
agent performed or reasonably should have performed.2 After all, if the single 
notion of legal responsibility applied to acts of commission falls to my skepti­
cism, that is enough to show that the concept "voluntariness" in the Code is 
deeply problematic. 
Note, then, that the characterization of "voluntariness" in (a) to (d) is 
remarkably uninformative. The first three conditions are entirely negative: 
bodily movements not "determined" by the agent—reflexive movements, 
sleepwalking, for example—are not voluntary. What, then, are the dis­
tinguishing properties of movements that are voluntary? We are not told. 
Condition (d) merely generalizes from the negative characterization in (a) 
to (c): only movements produced by the effort or determination of the actor 
are voluntary. 
That this section of the Code is nonspecific is not an automatic indictment, 
however. Laws are tools designed to fulfill certain functions, and some func­
tions can be executed with relatively blunt instruments, his, I surmise, is 
true of the above characterization of voluntariness. The relevant conditions 
are sparsely specified on the assumption that there is enough shared cultural 
knowledge concerning the causes of human conduct to fill the gaps. The lack 
of specificity in the law is tolerable, perhaps preferable, because our shared 
cultural knowledge enables us—lawyers, judges, and jurors—to apply the law 
in light of the particulars of each case. This may provide a degree of flexibility 
that a fuller specification of "voluntariness" may rule out. 
If the above characterization of voluntary action is deliberately generic in 
this way, then the crucial assumption must be something like this: most adult 
citizens (including those likely to serve as jurors) know that we are agents 
who sometimes "determine" their actions and also know when, under what 
conditions, our actions are in fact the results of our "determinations." If this 
crucial assumption is false, then the law cannot fulfill its function. If there 
is not shared knowledge in areas where the law has jurisdiction—if lawyers, 
judges, and jurors do not know enough to reliably discern actions genuinely 
determined by the actor from those determined by other factors—then the law 
is defective. 
116 N E U R O S C I E N C E  A N D  L E G A L  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  
The question, then, is whether this crucial assumption is true. Do most 
aduli citizens know that we are agents who sometimes determine their 
actions? Do most know when, under what conditions, our actions result 
from such determinations? The question is not whether most citizens believe 
that they have such knowledge, but whether they in fact have it. To answer 
this question, we have no recourse but to turn to our best developed scien­
tific theories of the self and, on the model of Darwin in the Origin, paint in 
vivid colors our most informed large-canvas view of our capacities as agents. 
Once we do that, we will see that the answer to this question, in light of cur­
rent knowledge, is a decidedly negative one; the concept of voluntariness in 
the above notion of legal responsibility is at odds with what we know about 
ourselves. 
THE AIMS AND STRATEGIES OF CONTEMPORARY 
THEORIES OF THE SELF 
I turn to the general aims and strategies of contemporary theories of the self. 
I do not claim that these aims and strategies are explicitly endorsed by con­
temporary theorists in philosophy, psychology, or legal studies. I claim only 
that they accurately reflect the overarching commitments and methods of 
many theorists in those areas. As we will see, these aims and strategies tend 
to diminish rather than enhance our chances of discovering the truth about 
ourselves. The methods with which we study ourselves are in need of reform. ' 
At a high level of abstraction, the methods with which we study ourselves 
are either conceptually conservative or conceptually imperialistic. Neither con­
servatism nor imperialism by itself is objectionable but, when applied to dubi­
ous concepts, both methods retard our efforts at discovering the truth. The call 
for reform, in consequence, is a call for directives that cure us of conservatism 
and imperialism, as well as directives that guide us in our efforts to discover 
the truth. 
Conceptual conservatism is a strategic orientation toward inquiry, affect­
ing the way we frame our questions and answers. The overarching goal is to 
conserve or save as far as possible concepts of apparent importance, concepts 
that appear salient in our more general worldview. The preferred strategy for 
saving apparently important concepts is to "locate" them amid the concepts 
and claims of some preferred base theory. For naturalists, the preferred base 
is usually a well-developed scientific theory; for non-naturalists, it is some 
well-entrenched part of our inherited worldview. Ruse (2003) presents a 
book-length exercise in conceptual conservatism, aspiring to save a concept 
of normative functions in evolutionary biology even at the cost of resuscitat­
ing Kant's (1790) theory of natural purposes. 
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Conceptual imperialism is more ambitious than conservatism. The over­
arching goal is not to save apparently important concepts as far as possible but 
to force the rest of our conceptual scheme to accommodate certain concepts 
at any cost. Certain concepts, it is assumed, have dominion over other con­
cepts and over methods of inquiry. These, according to the imperialist, are 
concepts without which we would be unable coherently to think or articulate 
a view of the relevant phenomena. Chishoim (1964) was an imperialist regard­
ing the human self—he insisted that the libertarian concept of free will had to 
be retained even at the cost of accepting that every conscious, rational person 
is a little Thomistic god. 
Conservatism and imperialism may be appropriate in some contexts but 
not when applied to dubious concepts. A concept is dubious when there are 
justified grounds for excluding it from our theorizing. Such concepts fall into 
two general groups. Some are dubious by descent. These are categories that 
descend to us from a worldview we no longer regard as true or promising, that 
have not been vindicated in any well-confirmed theories, but that nonetheless 
tend to influence the way we frame our inquiries. The concept of a nonphysical 
soul is illustrative. So far as we can surmise, the neural processes implement­
ing human thought and action operate under the principle of causal closure. 
Our best evidence for this is the utter lack of experiments in which the best 
explanation of observed phenomena requires the postulation of a nonphysical 
cause. 
Some concepts are dubious by psychological role. These are categories con­
trolled by conceptualizing capacities prone to abundant false positives or 
false negatives. Consider by analogy visual illusions. Under a range of condi­
tions, our visual capacities produce systemic errors. Similarly, under a range 
of conditions, our cognitive and affective capacities produce systemic errors. 
But there is a crucial disanalogy. Most visual illusions are easily identified 
and compensated for, whereas most conceptualizing illusions occur without 
the agents notice. Some conceptualizing illusions are so much a part of our 
deliberative field that it never occurs to us to be troubled by them—not, at 
any rate, until we meet with an ingenious experiment that reveals the sys­
temic error. 
The much-discussed theory of Daniel Wegner (2002) is a case in point. The 
human mind, according to Wegner, comprises a system that generates the 
felt experience of consciously willing and thereby consciously controlling our 
actions. Not all of our actions, of course, because many of our actions are rela­
tively thoughtless—just those we regard as the products of our will. What is 
provocative, and what reveals a tendency towards systemic error, is evidence 
adduced by Wegner that this system of conscious willing operates independ­
ently of the low level, nonconscious mechanisms that actually cause us to act. 
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Ihe mechanisms that cause our actions, it appears, are not the mechanisms 
that give us certain beliefs and feelings about the causes of our actions. We are 
led astray by the very constitution of our psychology. 
Wegner s theory, when integrated with theories from distinct areas of 
inquiry, wields considerable power. Indeed, Wegner combines experiments 
from his lab with evidence (some explicated later) concerning a broad range of 
affective and cognitive phenomena. The strength of his theory rests upon the 
integrated view of the self that emerges from these diverse phenomena, espe­
cially the view of our apparent capacity to control our actions by consciously 
willing. It is the breadth of converging evidence that makes it rational to hold 
that the concept of conscious willing, because it generates an abundance of 
false positives and negatives that are difficult to detect, is dubious by psycho­
logical role. 
I will explicate Wegner s theory in due course, but I wish to highlight a general 
feature of our inclination toward conservatism and imperialism, namely, that we 
tend to be most conservative or imperialistic with respect to concepts most dubi­
ous. The greater the staying power of a conceptual category, the greater our ten­
dency to try to save it, perhaps because we feel confident that long-lived concepts 
must be tracking something real and important. Indeed, the mechanisms that 
give concepts their staying power are among the very mechanisms that render 
some concepts so dubious. Some are preserved by culturally instituted mecha­
nisms of transmission; some by the architecture of our psychology (mechanisms 
that produce persistent errors we tend not to notice); and some, no doubt, are 
preserved both by cultural and psychological factors.' Concepts preserved by 
any of these mechanisms are going to recur in our deliberative activities; they 
are going to appear important precisely because they are so tenacious. 
Thus, we must be especially cautious in the study of the human self because 
the concepts with which we understand our capacities as agents are among 
the most dubious. Concepts such as "free will" and "moral responsibility" are 
clearly dubious by descent, thanks to our largely theological ancestry, and 
many of the concepts with which we understand our capacities as agents are 
dubious by psychological role, as we are about to see. 
CURATIVE DIRECTIVES 
If the above line of reasoning is correct, if the need for reform in our methods 
is real, we must diminish the retarding effects of our conservatism and impe­
rialism regarding dubious concepts. To that end, I propose we adopt directives 
for inquiry formulated in light of our best theories of the very mechanisms 
that lead us astray. I begin with a directive designed to diminish the ill effects 
of concepts dubious by psychological role; 
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DP:JFor any concept dubious by psychological role, do not make it a condi­
tion of adequacy 011 our theories that we "save" or otherwise preserve that 
concept; rather, identify the conditions (if any) under which the concept 
is correctly applied and withhold antecedent authority from that concept 
under all other conditions. 
Withholding antecedent authority from a concept comes to this: we frame 
our inquiries without that concept. This is not to adopt eliminativism con­
cerning dubious concepts, dhe directive is to withhold dubious concepts from 
inquiry until we have reasonable knowledge of the conditions, if any, under 
which they can correctly be applied. A further aim is to cultivate intellectual 
creativity. The aim is not merely to avoid concepts that demonstrably lead us 
astray but also to put ourselves under pressure to create alternative categories 
with which to explain and predict the phenomena.5 
When our knowledge of the mechanisms involved in the application of a 
concept gives rise to such doubts concerning that concept, the directive in DP 
is essential. We need a reliable process with which one part of our psychol­
ogy can mitigate the ill effects of another part. To illustrate, consider a few 
details of our apparent capacity for consciously willing our actions. Wegner's 
proposed system is triggered when we consciously perceive instances of the 
following pair: 
A thought about or the intention to perform action A 
& 
THE perception or recollection of oneself performing action A 
You think about taking another sip of wine and then perceive yourself sip 
ping. These conscious inputs trigger an interpretive system in your psychol­
ogy, the function of which is to render your actions intelligible. It achieves 
this in two steps. It first produces a causal hypothesis to the effect that you, 
by virtue of your prior thought or intention, caused yourself to perform the 
action. The hypothesis is that your conscious thought is the means by which 
you controlled the production of your action. Then the system produces an 
accompanying affect, a felt sense of achievement, what Wegner calls the emo­
tion of authorship.6 This interpretive system does all this even though your 
action was caused by a separate set of mechanisms. This is Wegner's theory of 
apparent mental causation. 
The power of this theory derives from the breadth of additional theories 
with which it integrates. Consider, for instance, the forward model of motor 
control.7 Suppose I ask you to perform a simple intentional action. I ask you 
to touch the tip of your nose with your right pointer finger. As you move your 
right arm, your brain generates a continuous stream of predictions about 
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where your arm ought to be at the next instant, relative to the goal of reaching 
the tip of your nose, lhat is why it is a "forward" model: the system generates 
predictions concerning the ideal future location of your arm. These predic­
tions are useful because they are compared to the continuous proprioceptive 
feedback regarding the actual position and trajectory of your arm. Any mis­
match between predicted and actual position is then used to update the signals 
sent to your muscles, thereby correcting your action in real time. All of this 
happens with breathtaking speed at a level of processing inaccessible to con­
scious awareness. 
What is intriguing is that, in the course of executing these anticipatory 
functions, your brain suppresses its own ability to fully process incoming sen­
sory information. Put generally, the processing of sensory information is sup­
pressed or at least attenuated whenever we act intentionally. This appears clear 
from experiments reported in Blakemore, Wolpert, and Frith (1999).8 In one 
study, experimenters first asked subjects to touch the palm of their right hand 
using a device manipulated with their left hand; subjects were asked, that is, to 
perform a simple intentional action. They then asked subjects to allow them, 
the experimenters, to touch subjects' right hand by manipulating the inter­
vening device. The results were striking. When the experimenter initiated the 
action—when the act of touching was not intended by the subjects—subjects 
rated the sensation in their right palm as intense and tickly. When, however, 
subjects initiated the action themselves, they rated the sensation as less intense 
and tickly. Our motor control capacities, in the course of executing intended 
actions, suppress the processing of incoming sensory information. 
The same attenuation occurred in a second study. Subjects once again were 
asked to touch the palms of their right hands by manipulating an intervening 
device with their left hands. What subjects did not know was that the exper­
imenters were introducing very short delays in the operation of the device. 
With each trial the motion of the intervening device and the subsequent sen­
sory perception were delayed relative to the subjects' initiation of the intended 
action. The results were striking. When the delay was short, subjects reported 
that the sensation was neither intense nor tickly. The brain, while executing 
the intended action, suppressed the processing of sensory input. But as the 
delay grew longer, as sensation became increasingly distant from action initia­
tion, the sensation of being tickled increased. The sensation was increasingly 
processed as coming from something external to the self.9 
This attenuation of sensory information is important in two ways. First, 
our motor capacities suppress an enormous quantity of sensory information 
whenever we act intentionally. One part of our psychology (motor control) 
conceals from another part (conscious awareness) a large set of causal infor­
mation. And this contributes to what we might call a kind ofphenomenological 
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quiet, a degree of subjective silence against which the things that do come to 
conscious awareness—including the conscious inputs that trigger Wegner's 
interpretive system—appear salient in our conscious, deliberative fields. The 
factors that come to conscious awareness, against this backdrop of quiet, are 
bound to strike us as causally efficacious, especially when processed by an 
interpretive system dedicated to causal intelligibility. Second, the misleading 
effects produced by this phenomenological quiet arise from the very archi­
tecture of our psychology. This is no small point. Some of Wegner's critics try 
to dismiss his view by insisting that he is concerned with oddball illusions or 
marginal mistakes that our otherwise veridical capacities do not suffer. But 
integrating Wegner's view in this way shows that these critics are mistaken. 
We are seduced not at the margins but by capacities at our agential core. 
Now consider the theory of naive realism, which also integrates with the 
theory of apparent mental causation. The main elements of naive realism 
are three: (1) We tend to assume that we see things in an unmediated and 
objective manner. (2) We tend to assume that other rational persons will see 
things as we do. (3) We tend to dismiss those who disagree as ignorant, sloth­
ful, irrational, or biased. The background suggestion is that, because each of 
us approaches a situation, especially situations involving other persons, with 
limited knowledge and extensive ignorance of what is going on, we must 
solve what researchers in Artificial Intelligence call the "frame" problem by 
quickly constructing an operable construal of the situation. We do this by 
imagining or filling in details that help us decide what is most significant 
about the situation we face.10 The origin of our naive realism, then, is that we 
construct a construal of the situation in the absence of a much-needed check. 
There is no check on the confidence that our construal is correct and, in 
consequence, no check on our confidence that our construal will be adopted 
by others. 
Why this absence? Why are we devoid of a mechanism to remind us that 
our construal is gleaned from a particular perspective and that people with 
other perspectives will likely construe the situation differently? We do not 
know. If, however, our tendency toward naive realism is manifest in social 
situations, we might do well to conjoin it with the theory of mind theory." 
On this view, our construal of the desires or intentions that motivate the 
behavior of other agents may strike us with such force that we are affectively 
inclined to trust it as accurate. A tendency to respond in this way may have 
provided anticipatory advantages during our evolutionary history; unbridled 
confidence in one's construal may have had greater selective value than epis-
temic caution. Even today, the feeling that one is right in one's assessments 
of others may conduce to decisive action, better learning, greater career pros­
pects, enhanced interpersonal relations, and increased survival. Arrogance 
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concerning ones self may be less costly than accuracy, especially in social 
interactions. 
lhe crucial upshot is that, in addition to the phenomenological quiet that 
accompanies our intentional actions, we naively overestimate the accuracy 
of our conscious assessments of the causes of our actions. We are seduced 
into thinking and feeling that the causal hypotheses that rise to conscious 
awareness are correct. And like the ill effects of phenomenological quiet, our 
naive realism results from the constitution of our psychology. The former are 
by-products of a central system (motor control), whereas the latter result from 
an absence in the architecture of our psychology. Either way, these deficits are 
the direct effects of the system's normal operations; mistakes at the margins 
are not the issue. 
The power of the directive in DP thus derives from the convergence of a 
range of theories, including those described here. The theory of apparent men­
tal causation is confirmed in part by the extent to which it integrates with the 
forward model of motor control, the theory of naive realism, and the theory of 
mind theory.12 It thus is rational to conclude that the concept of "consciously 
willing" is dubious by psychological role and subject to the directive in DP. 
This is important for assessing the relevance of contemporary science to the 
view of agency presupposed in the law. 
EXPLORATORY DIRECTIVES 
The directive in DP is curative; it aims to cure us of conservatism and imperial­
ism regarding dubious concepts. But it is limited. It helps us avoid what ought 
to be avoided without recommending an alternative strategy. The purpose of 
this section is to sketch a few components of an alternative that is progressive 
rather than conservative or imperialistic, and that is exploratory in the way 
that naturalists of the 19th century were explorers. Among the progressive's 
directives are the following: 
EH: For any capacity of the self we wish to understand, require that we 
frame our inquiry and our theory in terms of what is known concerning 
our evolutionary history. 
A: For any capacity of the self we wish to understand, assume that, as a 
consequence of our evolutionary history, it is endowed with the systemic 
function of anticipating objects or events relevant to organismic equilib­
rium, to the satisfaction of ecological demands, or to both. 
NC: For any conscious capacity of the human mind, expect that we will 
understand this capacity only after we discover the nonconscious, low-
level, anticipatory mechanisms implementing that capacity. 
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Although EH and A appear banal, their effect on our inquiries can be sub­
stantial, altering the way we conceptualize the very capacities we wish to study. 
To illustrate, consider the hypothesis that human intelligence is best con­
ceptualized as social intelligence. The hypothesis can be articulated in many 
ways, but the basic claim is that many of our affective and cognitive capaci­
ties evolved as tools enabling us to engage in myriad social relations. This is 
no mere speculation. It is based in part on knowledge concerning extant pri­
mate species. We know that, in one form or another, all primates are social 
animals,13 capable of identifying con-specifics, recognizing social relations 
between con-specifics, recognizing one's own relations with others, respond­
ing appropriately to changes in those relations, and so on. And it is easy to 
generate hypotheses concerning the anticipatory functions of all these capaci­
ties." We also know that Homo sapiens is the most social of primates. There 
is, for example, a clear difference in the breadth and depth of our cultural 
institutions, evidence that our capacities for social relations run wider and 
deeper. More specifically, human children by their fourth year clearly exercise 
the capacities posited in the theory of mind theory; 4 years is about the age at 
which most children begin to pass the false belief test. In addition, children 
as young as 9 months exhibit striking precursor capacities. They follow the 
gaze of adults, jointly focus on shared objects, imitate the behavior of others, 
and so on.15 And ingenious, recent experiments suggest that human infants 
are reading minds, even attributing false beliefs, as early as 2 years of age.16 By 
contrast, it is contentious whether other primate species possess the full suite 
of capacities posited in the theory of mind theory.17 
There is also evidence of our social intelligence from neuroscience. Human 
infants attend preferentially to other humans. They attend to human faces 
more than any other visual stimuli and to human speech more than any other 
auditory stimuli. Infants as young as 2 days exhibit a distinctive cerebral blood 
flow when they hear a normal sentence but not when the sentence is played 
backward. And so on.18 There is also the intriguing hypothesis that among 
the emotional systems implemented in the mammalian brain is what jaak 
Panksepp (1998) dubs the PANIC system. This system functions to gener­
ate behavioral routines to free the organism from life-threatening situations. 
Effects of this system are evident in the distress calls of infants when sepa­
rated from their mother, which are accompanied by physiological processes 
exhibited when an organism is suffocating, when it cannot catch a breath. This 
powerful response to separation is implemented in distinct neural structures 
and chemical processes identified by Panksepp. And the very same structures 
and processes that constitute the PANIC system also implement the reaction 
that adult mammals have to loss. Human grief is implemented in the brain's 
PANIC system. 
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Panksepp's hypothesis provides a striking account of our social emotions. 
If the basic function of the PANIC system is to generate behaviors to free the 
organism from threats to its life, a closely related function is to empower the 
organism to avoid or alleviate the experience of loss by establishing social 
attachments. The hypothesis is that the neural system that causes us to panic 
in response to loss is the very system that moves us to seek emotional attach­
ments with others. Indeed, the PANIC system comprises neural structures 
known to implement certain forms of physical pain, suggesting that separa­
tion distress and grief are, literally, a form of pain and that the compulsion 
toward social relatedness is an anticipatory strategy for keeping some forms 
of pain at bay.19 
This brief survey of the social intelligence hypothesis illustrates the power 
of EH and A. Notice, in particular, that our initial understanding of a capac­
ity is altered by the application of these directives. Wegners interpretive sys­
tem, once again, is a case in point. What is the evolved, anticipatory function 
of a system that, by hypothesis, causes us to falsely believe that our conscious 
intentions cause our actions? Wegner (2007) offers several speculations, each 
keyed to an anticipatory, social function, and when we conceptualize our 
capacity for conscious willing in this way, as dedicated to some social func­
tion, our understanding is indeed altered. Instead of conceptualizing the feel­
ing of conscious willing as evidence of a remarkable form of freedom, we 
conceptualize it in terms of our evolutionary history and the ways in which 
it prepares us for what is likely to occur next. We see the capacity as, for 
example, a mechanism that inclines us to inform one another about actions 
we are likely to perform, or a mechanism that causes us to feel a sense of 
obligation toward one another, and so on. And because there appears to be 
nothing parochial about conscious willing in this regard, the point here can 
be generalized: we should expect that, as our knowledge of the self progresses, 
our understanding of the phenomena we are trying to explain will shift in 
significant ways. 
This shift also illustrates the power of the directive in NC. The feeling of 
willing, for instance, occurs at the level of conscious awareness; we are intro-
spectively aware of some features of the process. And we tend to feel confident 
that the way things appear to us concerning the causes of our actions is an 
accurate reflection of the actual causes. Our confidence, however, is misplaced. 
Once we ask about the anticipatory function of any conscious capacity, we will 
likely discover mechanisms operating below conscious awareness that force us 
to revise our initial understanding. In general, it is rational to expect that our 
capacities for conscious experience will not be adequately understood until we 
discover the evolved, anticipatory functions of nonconscious mechanisms that 
implement those capacities. 
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If these exploratory directives are defensible, we must do more than with­
hold antecedent authority from dubious concepts. We must also fill the gaps 
in our conceptual repertoire left by the application of DP. We may begin by 
framing our inquiries with relevant knowledge from evolutionary biology and 
searching for the anticipatory functions of mechanisms that operate beyond 
the reach of conscious awareness. These are strategies informed by our best 
sciences of the self. And when we apply these strategies, we begin to appreciate 
how little of our capacities as agents we presently understand. 
SKEPTICISM CONCERNING HUMAN AGENCY 
If, then, the concept "conscious willing" is dubious by psychological role, and if 
the exploratory directives reveal that our former understanding of "conscious 
willing" is best replaced by a more informed understanding of the relevant 
capacity, then it is no longer rational to frame our inquiries in terms of this 
concept. It is no longer rational to assume that our alleged capacity for con­
scious willing is what we formerly took it to be. In particular, we cannot take it 
as given that our apparent capacity to consciously will our own actions reflects 
an actual capacity to control our actions. This is the basis for my skepticism 
concerning human agency. 
The skeptical thesis is best formulated as an epistemic defeater: for any 
action we perform, we cannot justifiably claim to know from the first-person 
point of view the actual causes of our action. The claim is not that we never 
have true beliefs about the causes of our actions, but rather that we cannot reli­
ably discriminate from the first-person point of view between cases in which 
our beliefs about our actions are true and cases in which they are false. This 
defeats the possibility of justifying, at least from the first-person perspective, 
beliefs about the causes of our actions. That is the lesson on which the theories 
described above appear to converge. 
Still, this defeater appears to conflict with any number of ordinary cases in 
which we intuitively take ourselves to know the causes of our actions. Suppose 
it is Monday afternoon and you see me walking across the parking lot and 
entering my daughter's school. You ask me what I am doing. I tell you I am 
picking up Cassie and taking her to her piano lesson. Being nosy, or perhaps 
being an inquisitive social psychologist, you ask me why I am doing this. Being 
a congenial philosopher, I tell you that several weeks ago my wife and I agreed 
on a weekly schedule. 1 am taking Cassie to her lesson because that is what I 
agreed to do.20 
Such intuitions, especially about cases in which the relevant action has been 
planned in advance, may appear to challenge the epistemic defeater.21 But in 
fact they do not. In responding to your question, it is plausible to suppose that 
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my episodic memory quickly recollects a relevant event. It retrieves an agree­
ment I made several weeks ago, the content of which is that every Monday 
afternoon during the semester I will take Cassie to her lesson. My memory did 
this, presumably, because the social situation demanded a timely response to 
your question. But the mere fact that my memory retrieved this recollection 
does not entail or even suggest that the content of this recollection is the actual 
cause of my action. My episodic memory, in recalling my earlier agreement, 
appears nicely attuned to considerations of relevance, but relevance requires 
nothing stronger than association. 
Moreover, the actual causes of my action, whatever they might be, are factors 
that caused me to leave the house and drive to Cassie's school, and for all I can 
tell from the first-person point of view, the agreement I made weeks ago is caus­
ally unrelated to those factors. Of course, it certainly feels to me that the content 
of my recollection is causally related, but the reliability of this feeling is under­
mined by the theories surveyed above.221 also grant that I may truly believe that 
my recollection is causally relevant, but true belief does not suffice for justifica­
tion. Hie theories surveyed above show that, from the first-person perspective, 
we cannot reliably discriminate cases in which our prior thoughts cause our 
actions from cases in which they do not. That is the basis of my defeater. 
We might vary the locus of the objection. Instead of fixing on my present 
recollection of an agreement made several weeks ago, fix on the conscious 
thoughts that occurred just before the action. Suppose I was engrossed in 
work all afternoon until I happened to glance at my watch. "Oh," I exclaimed, 
"time to collect Cassie's music and get to her school!" Suppose I even exhorted 
myself: "I cannot renege on my agreement with Ann!" Suppose, finally, that 
upon reaching the school and hearing your question, I consciously recall and 
report to you the exclamations and exhortation that occurred just before initi­
ating my action. Does this show that I know the actual causes of my action? 
Not at all. It is true that my agreement with my wife was recalled to con­
scious awareness just before I began my Monday afternoon routine. But, again, 
it does not follow that this recollection is part of the actual causes of the action. 
All manner of nonconscious processes were no doubt occurring in me as I 
realized it was time to stop working, and I have conscious access to virtually 
none of them. And we know from the theories of Wegner and Wolpert and 
Blakemore and others that the things which do rise to conscious awareness 
often seduce us toward causal beliefs that are demonstrably false. That, to 
repeat, is the upshot of the theories canvased above: we know that in many 
cases the correlations we observe among our conscious perceptions or rec­
ollections concerning our actions are unreliable indicators of genuine causal 
connections, and nothing available from the first-person perspective enables 
us to discriminate the causes from mere correlations. 
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In general, it makes no difference where in the sequence we frx our atten­
tion. Even when the relevant action was planned weeks in advance, the actor 
is faced with an open question concerning the actual causes that finally move 
him to act. This is the basis of my skepticism. To refute it, we need an alterna­
tive theory of the self based upon a convergence of evidence of equal or greater 
strength. Short of that, no matter how unintuitive or unsettling it may be, 
skepticism is the rational position to adopt. 
There is, moreover, an analogue to the above defeater that applies from 
the third-person perspective. When we claim that some other agent acted 
voluntarily, we posit a causal process that includes what we traditionally 
describe as "conscious willing." Yet, as we have seen, because the concept 
"conscious willing" is dubious by psychological role, it ought to be factored 
out of our inquiries and replaced by considerations from our evolutionary and 
social history. If that is right, then we cannot justifiably frame our inquiries 
in terms of a concept so deeply dubious. Precisely that is the basis for an 
additional defeater: for any action performed by another agent, we cannot 
justifiably claim to know that the agent acted voluntarily by consciously willing 
it. It must be emphasized that this defeater rests upon the above directives. 
The curative directive directs us to withhold antecedent authority, and the 
exploratory directives direct us to conceptualize the relevant capacity in terms 
of our history. The reason, therefore, that we cannot justifiably claim to know 
whether another person consciously willed her action is that, in light of our 
best sciences of the self, the central conceptual category has no legitimate role 
in contemporary inquiry. 
You might worry that my skepticism refutes itself by rendering impossible 
all forms of rational debate. If we are indeed faced with my defeaters concern­
ing our reasons for acting, and if adducing evidential or logical relations for a 
scientific or philosophical thesis qualifies as an action, it appears we can never 
know the reasons why anyone ever accepts one theory over another, which 
would undermine the very possibility of rational debate. It would seem to 
show, in particular, that I cannot give any reasons for skepticism concerning 
human agency." 
This worry is motivated by the apparent phenomenology of actual 
intellectual discussions. When in conversation you challenge some part of 
my view, I focus my attention on specific features of the world. When, for 
instance, you ask me why I hold a given thesis, I appeal to features of the 
world I judge to be evidentially potent. What seems crucial is that the features 
to which I appeal are consciously accessible to me. How could it be otherwise? 
How could I appeal in conversation to considerations that do not come to 
conscious awareness? The worry, then, is that my defeaters conflict with this 
bit of phenomenology. My first defeater seems to entail that I cannot justifiably 
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claim to know my reasons for defending the relevant thesis, which seems 
to preclude the possibility of my rationally defending my view. My second 
defeater seems to entail that you cannot justifiably claim to know my reasons 
lor defending the thesis, which appears to make reasoned exchange between 
us utterly impossible. 
'here are several reasons why this objection is wide of the mark. I will 
mention just two. First, the phenomenology of our rational discussions 
is concerned with a relatively narrow notion of "reasons." My reasons for 
accepting a given thesis are patterns of evidential relations between facts 
in the world and the contents of the thesis, or logical relations between the 
thesis and other theses. As such, these sorts of reasons are limited. Even 
if they reveal substantive relations between the thesis and certain facts or 
certain other theses, they fail to explain why I endorse the thesis. It is naive 
to assume that I endorse any thesis simply because of the substantive rela­
tions it bears to certain facts or to other theses. This is not to confess a foible 
or infirmity unique to myself. It is true of any intelligent organism whose 
capacities for acting are a mix of cognitive and affective capacities that oper­
ate mostly beyond the reach of conscious awareness. The evidential or logical 
relations I consciously acknowledge as my reasons are surely supplemented 
and in some instances supplanted by a host of nonconscious processes. That, 
at any rate, is the upshot of the scientific theories surveyed above. And that 
means there is a much fatter notion of "reasons" relevant to all forms of 
human action. This fatter notion is surely applicable to the actions we per­
form in the course of intellectual debates, but it is even more pertinent to 
actions that fall under concepts of legal responsibility. Indeed, this relatively 
fat notion of "reasons" is at the heart of the concept of criminal responsibil­
ity described in section I. 
My second response is that it is false that my view rules out the possibil­
ity of knowing our reasons for acting. It rules out the possibility of knowing 
our reasons in certain ways, including ways assumed by many philosophers, 
legal theorists, and laypersons, but it is compatible with knowledge acquired 
in other ways. So long as my first defeater stands, we cannot justifiably claim 
to know our reasons from a first-person point of view, but that leaves open the 
possibility of subjecting our agential capacities, including our reason-giving 
capacities, to scientific investigation. My second defeater, moreover, suggests 
we cannot justifiably claim to know that another agent acted voluntarily by 
virtue of conscious willing. But that is compatible with the scientific study of 
our capacities as agents in terms of conceptual categories other than "conscious 
willing" and "voluntariness." Whether we can at present articulate an alterna­
tive concept is not to the point. It would be the most egregious form of con­
ceptual imperialism to insist that we must preserve our traditional concepts of 
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agency just because we have yet to formulate other concepts informed by what 
is actually known about the human self,24 
"VOLUNTARINESS" AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 
I come at last to the troubling implications that my defeaters raise for "legal 
responsibility." In the Model Penal Code, a notion of criminal responsi­
bility is explicated in part by appeal to "voluntariness," though the expli­
cation given, as we saw in section I, is remarkably uninformative. This is 
so, I surmise, on the assumption that there exists sufficient shared cultural 
knowledge to fill the gaps in any given case. The crucial assumption, then, 
is that most citizens know that we are agents who sometimes determine 
their actions and also know when, under what conditions, our actions result 
from such determinations. And this crucial assumption is precisely where 
we meet the troubling implications of my skepticism, for this assumption 
is indeed false. 
It should be clear by now that we do not possess shared cultural knowledge 
concerning the nature of human agency because we are burdened with the 
previously described epistemic defeaters. Thanks to progress in knowledge, we 
cannot justifiably claim to know from the first-person perspective the causes 
of our actions. Nor can we justifiably claim to know of some other person 
that he "determined" his own action because the central concept is so clearly 
dubious and our most fruitful methods direct us to conceptualize the relevant 
capacity in very different terms. In general, recent progress in the scientific 
study of the human self reveals that we do not know what kinds of agent we 
are. The characterization of criminal responsibility given in the Model Penal 
Code cannot serve its intended function. 
Of course, the assumption that there exists shared knowledge of our capac­
ities as agents runs deep and wide in our culture. That I do not deny. But the 
persistence and power of that assumption can be explained without grant­
ing its truth. It can be explained, in particular, by the persistence and power 
of concepts dubious by descent and by psychological role, and by our stub­
born inclination toward conceptual conservatism and imperialism. It may be 
possible, moreover, to alter or eliminate this widespread assumption. If the 
expectations and intuitions of informed citizens are brought up to speed, if 
they come to reflect the larger implications of our best sciences, then appeals 
to commonsense may become increasingly impotent, even pathetic, when 
opposed to the findings of contemporary science, and our traditional con­
cepts of the self may be revised or replaced. Until then, however, we remain 
burdened with laws that, for wont of knowledge of ourselves, cannot fulfill 
their functions. 
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These skeptical doubts concerning human agency are grave in two 
ways. They are grave because they are derived from demanding methods 
of inquiry. The argumentative strategy of Darwin's Origin is illustrative. Its 
power stems from the convergence upon a single view of life from a broad 
range of distinct phenomena concerning living things. The same holds for 
understanding core capacities of living things, including our capacities to 
deliberate, choose, and act. There is a growing convergence on the nature of 
the self across the relevant sciences. Not a fully articulated view of the self, 
to be sure, but enough to articulate some important claims: (1) A great deal 
of our mental lives is lived beneath the level of conscious awareness. (2) At 
least some of the phenomena comprising conscious awareness are partial, 
misleading, or illusory. (3) As a consequence, we are in a muddle about our 
capacities as agents; we know enough to appreciate how little we understand 
our experiences as selves. That is one reason why the doubts are grave: they 
emerge from a breadth and depth of current scientific knowledge that cannot 
rationally be ignored. 
The doubts appear grave in another way, in terms of vital practical mat­
ters. The most pressing question is whether these doubts concerning human 
agency will take hold in the larger culture and, if they do, what effects they 
will likely provoke. One problematic effect will be the lack of a clear alter­
native. We live in a period of profound uncertainty about the nature of our 
selves; we have no choice but to endure a great deal of confusion. Another 
problem is knowing when to trust the converging results of human inquiry. 
How integrated and mature must a set of scientific theories be for us ration­
ally to use it as the basis for policies that affect social stability, fairness, and 
human well-being? This is a deeply vexing question, especially for organisms 
who need to anticipate and feel a sense of control. Finally, there is the ques­
tion of whether we have the stomach for periods of conceptual confusion, for 
not knowing how to think or feel ourselves as agents, and whether we will 
respond with creativity to better conform our beliefs and practices to the way 
the world actually is, or whether we will panic and revert to conservatism and 
imperialism.25 
NOTES 
1. We tend to attribute guilt tor what a person actually does, not for what a person 
merely thinks. Hence the focus here on bodily movement. 
2. On this point, see chapters 6 and 7 of this text. 
3. The discussion in this and the next two sections is a highly compressed version 
of portions of my recent book (Davies 2009). Compression of course tends to 
distort. I hope, however, there is intelligibility enough to recommend the fuller 
discussion in the book. 
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4. Cultural mechanisms of conceptual stasis are discussed in Norris and Inglehart 
2004, Richerson and Boyd 2005, chapter 6 of Davies 2009, and elsewhere. Evidence 
for the efficacy of psychological mechanisms of stasis is described throughout this 
essay and in Davies 2009. 
5. In Davies 2009, part 2,1 defend an additional directive to diminish the ill effects 
of concepts dubious by descent. 
6. Since "sense" and "emotion" hardly appear equivalent, you might worry that I am 
being conceptually flat-footed. Perhaps so. But conceptual fussiness is a virtue 
only when it makes a difference in substance. Wegner is interested in not one 
specific affective response but rather a whole cluster. He is interested in the full 
range of responses to our own actions that tempt us to feel that we are conscious 
controllers of those actions. 
7. See Wolpert at al 1995. Wolpert 1997 is an accessible overview. 
8. See also Blakemore, Frith, and Wolpert 2000. 
9. Choudhury and Blakemore 2006 provide a recent overview. 
10. For experimental evidence, see Ross and Ward 1996, Pronin et al. 2002, Pronin 
et a!. 2004, and Pronin 2007. This last paper surveys recent studies of the biasing 
effects of naive realism. 
11. Tomasello 1999 and Leslie 2000 are good overviews. 
12. The full integrative picture is much broader than I can depict here. Also relevant 
is John Bargh's work on automaticity (e.g., Bargh et al. 2001; Dijksterhuis and 
Bargh 2001), Timothy Wilson's on knowing our reasons for acting (e.g., Nisbett 
and Wilson 1977a and 1977b; Wilson 2002), Martin Conway's on autobiographi­
cal memory (e.g., Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000; Conway 2003), and so on. 
13. See Smuts et al. 1987 for the remarkable range of social structures among primate 
species. 
14. Indeed, the challenge is generating experimental evidence with which to 
discriminate among all the possible hypotheses. 
15. Tomasello 1995 and 1999. 
16. Baillargeon et al. 2010. 
17. Tomasello and Call 1997. 
18. These references come from Cheney and Seyfarth's marvelous 2007 book on 
social intelligence in baboons and humans (p. 6). Cheney and Seyfarth cite 
Dehaene-Lambertz et al. 2002 and Pena et al. 2003. 
19. See chapter 14 of Panksepp 1998. The implications of this view for the so-called 
"reactive attitudes" are considerable. Or so I think. See chapter 9 of Davies 
2009. 
20. This oversimplifies, of course. There are several reasons why i take Cassie to her 
lessons, including the pleasure of being with her. 
21. I am grateful to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for raising this challenge. 
22. The reliability of this feeling may vary with certain features of the action and 
the situation in which it occurs. This appears to be an implication of the theory 
defended in Wilson 2002. When action and context are relatively simple and 
unambiguous, reliability may be greater; the interpretive system that helps us 
make sense of our actions may be less prone to error in uncluttered contexts. 
(I discuss this point in Davies 2009:146ff.) This is not, however, a difference we 
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can read off our feelings at the time, and it leaves ample room for error in the 
complex and ambiguous real-life cases in which knowledge of our reasons mat­
ters most. 
23. 1 am grateful to Nicole Vincent tor pressing this worry. 
24. Ihese two replies merely sketch the direction that a fuller response would 
likely take. 
25. This essay descends from a presentation given at Delft Technical University 
in August 2009 on the occasion of an interdisciplinary conference, Moral 
Responsibility: Neuroscience, Organization, and Engineering, organized by Neelke 
Doom, Jessica Nihlen Fahlquist, and Nicole Vincent. I am grateful to the organ­
izers tor a setting in which scholars from a wide range of fields engaged construc­
tively. My travels to the Netherlands were supported by the Wendy and Emery 
Reves Center lor International Studies at the College of William and Mary and by 
Silvia Tandeciaraz, Dean of Educational Policy at the College. I am grateful for 
both sources ot support. I also received help from several good thinkers. Thanks 
to Stephen Morse and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for much-needed advice; to 
Walter, George Harris, and Nicole Vincent for probing comments on an earlier 
draft; to an anonymous referee tor OUP Press for constructive resistance; and to 
Nicole for thoughtful advice throughout. 
REFERENCES 
Baillargeon, R., R. M. Scott, and Z. He (2010). "False-belief understanding in infants." 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14(3); 110-118. 
Bargh, J, P. Goliwitzer, A. Lee-Chai, K. Barndollar, and R. Troetschel (2001). "The 
automated will; Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals." Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 81: 1014-1027. 
Blakemore, S. J., C. Frith, and D. Wolpert (1999). "Spatiotemporal prediction modu­
lates the perception of self-produced stimuli." lournal of Cognitive Neuroscience 11: 
551-559. 
Blakemore, S. J., D. Wolpert, and C. Frith (2000). "Why can't you tickle yourself?" 
NeuroReport 11(11): R11-R16. 
Cheney, D., and R. Seyfarth (2007). Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of Social Intel­
ligence. Chicago, 1L, University of Chicago Press. 
Chisholm, R. (1964). "Human freedom and the self." The Lindley Lecture, University 
of Kansas. 
houdhury, S., and S. J. Blakemore (2006). Intentions, actions, and the self. In: Does 
Consciousness Cause Behavior? S. Pockett, W. Banks, and S. Gallagher. Cambridge, 
MA, MIT Press. 
Conway, M. (2003). "Cognitive-affective mechanisms and processes in autobiographi­
cal memory," Memory 11(2): 217-224. 
Conway, M., and C. Pleydell-Pearce (2000). "The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the memory system." Psychological Review 107(2), 261-288. 
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Pres­
ervation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. (A facsimile of the first edition 
with an introduction by Ernst Mayr, 1964.) Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press. 
Skepticism Concerning Human Agency 133 
Davies, P. S. (2009). Subjects of the World: Darwin's Rhetoric and the Study of Agency 
in Nature. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. 
Dehaene-Lambertz, G., S. Dehaene, and L. Hertz-Pannier (2002). 
"Functional-neuroimaging of speech perception in infants." Science 298: 2013-
2015. 
Dijksterhuis, A., and J. Bargh (2001). The perception-behavior expressway: Auto­
matic effects of social perception on social behavior. In: Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, Volume 33. M. P. Zanna. San Diego, CA, Academic Press, pp. 
1-40. 
Kant, I. (1790). Critique of Judgment. (Translated by J.H. Bernard, 1951, Hafner 
Press.) 
Leslie, A. (2000). "Theory of mind" as a mechanism of selective attention. In: 'Ihe New 
Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd edition. M. Gazzaniga. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 
pp. 1235-1247. 
Nisbett, R„ and T. Wilson (1977a). "Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes." Psychological Review 84:231-259. 
Nisbett, R., and T. Wilson (1977b). "The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious altera­
tion of judgments." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35: 250-256. 
Norris, P., and R. Inglehart (2004). Sacred and Secular. New York, Cambridge Univer­
sity Press. 
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience. New York, Oxford University Press. 
Pena, M., A. Maki, D. Kovacic, G. Dehaene-Lambertz, H. Koizumi, F. Bouquet, and J. 
Mehler (2003). "Sounds and silence: An optical topography study of language recog­
nition at birth." Proceeding of the National Academy of Science 100:11702-11705. 
Pronin, E. (2007). "Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment." Trends 
in Cognitive Science 11: 37-43. 
Pronin, E„ D. Lin, and L. Ross (2002). "The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self 
versus others." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28: 369-381. 
Pronin, E., T. Gilovich, and L. Ross (2004). "Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: 
Divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others." Psychological Review 111: 781— 
799. 
Richerson, P., and R. Boyd (2005). Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed 
Human Evolution. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. 
Ross, L„ and A. Ward (1996). Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for social 
conflict and misunderstanding. In: Values and Knowledge. T. Brown, E. Reed, and 
E. Turiel. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum, 103-135. 
Ruse.M. (2003). Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press. 
Smuts, B. B„ D. Cheney, R. Seyfarth, R. Wrangham, and T. Struhsaker (1987). Pritnate 
Societies. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. 
Tomaselio, M. (1995). Joint attention as social cognition. In: Joint Attention: Its Origin 
and Role in Development. C. Moore and P. Dunham. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum. 
Tomaselio, M. (1999). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press. 
Tomaselio, M., and J. Call (1997). Primate Cognition. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
134 N E U R O S C I E N C E  A N D  L E G A L  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  
Wegner, D, (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Wegner, D. (2007). Self is magic, In: Psychology and Free Will. J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman, 
and R. F. Baumeister. New York, Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, T. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious. Cam­
bridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
Wolpert, D. (1997). "Computational approaches to motor control." Trends in Cognitive 
Science 1(6): 209-216. 
Wolpert, D., Z. Ghahramani, and M. Jordan (1995). "An internal model for sensori­
motor integration." Science 269: 1880-1882. 
